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Abstract
I examine investors’ reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry from 2002 to 2008. Over this period,
investors anticipate the announcements, as demonstrated by the fact that the cumulative
abnormal returns are not statistically significant. In addition, I test to determine the effect
of excess capacity on investors’ reactions. From 2002 to 2004, investors do not recognize
acquisitions as a response to excess capacity, as the excess capacity measures utilized
have no effect on the size of the cumulative abnormal return. From 2005 to 2008,
however, excess capacity measures have a positive effect on cumulative abnormal return,
indicating that investors started to recognize the threat of excess capacity and acquisitions
as a response to that threat.
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Introduction
Since the birth of the industry, big pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
have been fully integrated machines, motivated by the search for the next blockbuster
drug (defined as a drug whose sales exceed $1 billion). As described by former
GlaxoSmithKline CEO, Jean-Pierre Garnier, the business model is simple – “new
products are discovered, developed, launched, and protected by various patents” (Garnier,
2008). Typically, products are protected for ten to twelve years before the patent expires
and products face competition from generic drugs. At this point, revenues from the drug
drop off and the search for the next blockbuster commences (Garnier, 2008). Big
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are forced to focus on constant replacement of
their pipeline. This is an incredibly difficult task, as product success is not just a function
of enormous firm investment – compounds are subject to extensive clinical trials and
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.
The past decade appears to have been a successful period for the industry, as
“average sales for a recently launched drug grew by nearly 50%, and more than 30
achieved coveted ‘blockbuster’ status” (Booth et al., 2004). However, the past decade has
also demonstrated how unsustainable the big pharmaceutical and biotechnology business
model has become. Research and development productivity, the ratio of research and
development expense to the number of approved drugs, is at an all-time low. The
industry’s research and development investment has grown from $2 billion in 1980 to
$43 billion in 2006. Over the same period, however, the number of drugs approved by the
FDA has remained the same (Garnier, 2008). It is expected that the blockbuster drug
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model will deliver a weak 5% return on investment, with only one out of six new drugs
likely to deliver returns above their cost of capital (Gilbert et al., 2003).
Many factors have been identified as the cause of this serious decline in research
and development productivity. Most importantly, research and development costs have
mushroomed – it has been estimated that the average drug, including its launch, costs
close to $1.7 billion (Gilbert et al., 2003). Every aspect of drug development has become
more expensive, from the construction of laboratories to the discovery of new chemical
compounds (Booth et al., 2004). In addition, it is simply more challenging to develop
drugs for the diseases that have not been addressed thus far. Clearly, the diseases that are
most easily cured have already been overcome (Garnier, 2008). Certainly this issue is
related to the previous mention of increased costs – the more difficult compounds to
discover are also those that are more expensive to discover. The industry believed the
advances made in genomics would greatly mitigate the issue of discovery (Booth et al.,
2004). However, this advancement has not proven to deliver significant results. This
issue can only be tackled by substantially more efficient discovery practices.
Finally, the passing of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 greatly simplified the
procedure competing firms must go through to develop generic drugs (Garnier, 2008).
These firms only need to prove bioequivalence (that the active ingredient in the generic
drug is absorbed at the same rate as the brand-name drug) in order to be approved by the
FDA (Higgins et al., 2006). This dramatically decreased the cost and time it took to seek
FDA approval for generic drugs. Before the passing of the Act, “only 35% of top-selling
drugs with expired patents faced generic competition. By 1998, that number was close to
100%” (Higgins et al., 2006). Since the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, when patents

3

expire, firms have started to lose their market share immediately. This has posed an
enormous threat to the “blockbuster model” (Gilbert et al., 2003).
The threats to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry have caused
industry-wide excess capacity. Large firms face increased danger when patent cliffs
approach and pipeline gaps widen. They have started to respond by participating in a
large number of mergers and acquisitions. The big pharmaceutical and biotechnology
firms are acquiring smaller firms in order to fill in their product line and fend off excess
capacity (Austin, 2008).
I seek to determine whether or not investors are aware of the significant threat of
excess capacity and if they view mergers and acquisitions as a solution to the problem. I
will determine whether or not cumulative abnormal returns exist in a 5 day window
around the day of the announcement of 194 deals from 2002 to 2008. I will then test to
see the effect of financial measures of excess capacity on the cumulative abnormal
returns. I predict that investors will respond positively to the news of a merger or
acquisition. Investors will identify excess capacity as a problem facing the acquirer and
respond positively when they hear that the firm is taking action to address the gaps in its
pipeline. Therefore, I predict that excess capacity measures will have a positive effect on
cumulative abnormal returns.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of previous
literature related to mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industry, and in general; Section 3 describes the collection and use of data; Section 4
discusses the methodology used in testing my hypothesis; Section 5 presents my
empirical results; Section 6 discusses the implications of my results; Section 7 concludes.
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Literature Review
2.1 Excess Capacity Theory
Andrade and Stafford (2002) examine the economic role of mergers across
multiple industries (not including the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry). In
particular, they test whether or not mergers occur during times of industry-wide excess
capacity, as is the case with the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry today. The
authors’ measure of excess capacity is the percentage of total industry capacity that is
actually utilized. Andrade et al. regress industry-wide capacity utilization against merger
and non-merger investment and determined that a decrease in capacity utilization leads to
an increase in merger activity across industries. Therefore, it appears that excess capacity
has long been a determinant of merger activity.
2.2 Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry Excess Capacity
Excess capacity is commonly proposed as a reason for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms to engage is merger activity. Mergers and acquisitions are viewed as
a response to the trend of decreasing research and development productivity across the
industry. Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson (2007) test this theory in a two-stage analysis
by first analyzing the propensity for firms to merge and then examining a merger’s effect
on firm performance. Danzon et al. test the effects of Tobin’s Q, lagged sales growth and
the number of marketed drugs in a firm’s pipeline (along with other excess capacity
measures) on the propensity of a firm to engage in merger activity. The authors also
divide the sample by firm size. They find that large firms have a higher propensity to
undertake acquisitions if the firm has excess capacity characteristics. For small firms, the
authors determine that merger activity is typically an exit solution for financially unstable
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firms that do not exhibit characteristics of excess capacity. Danzon et al. also test the
effect of a merger on various measures of firm performance, such as operating profit,
sales and enterprise value. They find that performance is not different between firms that
do and do not undertake acquisitions.
Higgins and Rodriguez (2005) also test the effect of excess capacity on the
likelihood of acquisition in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. First, the
authors create a desperation index for each firm in their sample. The index is created
based on the exclusivity horizon of the firm’s pipeline and on a score of the “health” of
their pipeline. A healthy pipeline is one that has many compounds in later stages, such as
Phase II or Phase III, of development. The authors use the desperation index, along with
other measures of excess capacity, such as research and development intensity and the
number of alliances formed in a particular year, to determine its effect on the likelihood
that a firm undertake an acquisition. Higgins et al. find that firms that are more desperate
and have unhealthy pipelines are more likely to engage in merger activity. The authors
also consider the effect of alliances on the cumulative abnormal return over a three day
window around the announcement. It is hypothesized that the increase in access to
information that results from an alliance would make the acquisition more beneficial.
Indeed, Higgins et al. find that a previous alliance with the target leads to a larger
cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer. The authors demonstrate that excess
capacity, in the form of an unhealthy pipeline, causes firms to essentially outsource their
research and development through the acquisition of smaller pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms.
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In his working paper, Ornaghi (2005) examines the effect of mergers in the
pharmaceutical industry on not only firm performance, but also innovation in the merged
firm and its competitors. Specifically, he tests the effects on research and development
intensity, research productivity (the ratio of the number of patents to research and
development expense) and returns to shareholders post-acquisition. He finds that mergers
have a negative effect on each firm characteristic previously mentioned. The author
concludes that mergers in the pharmaceutical industry actually decrease research and
development productivity. Based on this evidence, pharmaceutical firms may be
exacerbating the problems that affect the industry as a whole by participating in
horizontal mergers. If we consider the possibility that pharmaceutical and biotechnology
firms are responding to excess capacity and decreasing research and development
productivity by merging, and that this activity may be further decreasing research and
development productivity, we would expect to see investors to react negatively to the
announcement of mergers.
2.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) investigate the improvements in performance
after mergers in the 50 largest US mergers between 1979 and 1984. In particular, the
authors test to determine if abnormal returns at the announcement of the merger are a
predictor of future improvements in post-acquisition performance. Healy et al. find a very
positive relationship between abnormal returns at the announcement of a merger and an
increase in operating cash flows after the merger. In addition, the authors found an even
stronger relationship if the acquirer and target were in overlapping businesses. These
results indicate that investors, in fact, anticipate the improvement in performance as a
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result of a merger, especially if the acquirer and target are in the same business sector. In
my sample, I only consider targets and acquirers in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industry. According to Healy et al. it is possible that I will find higher abnormal returns
on the announcement date because of my restricted, same-industry deal list.
Prabhala (1997) analyzes the traditional and conditional methods in event studies.
While describing the intuition behind conditional models, Prabhala notes the difference
between the fact and the information the announcement reveals. In particular, the author
notes that an announcement of acquisition from a firm with a history of acquisitions
would not surprise investors. Therefore, abnormal returns are not expected in this case. It
is when unexpected information is revealed in an announcement that abnormal returns are
observed. In the case of my sample, if investors believe the firm should respond to, for
example, excess capacity by undertaking an acquisition, abnormal returns are not
expected. In addition, many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies made multiple
acquisitions in my sample period. According to Prabhala, this would decrease the
likelihood of observing abnormal returns.
Together, these studies address the questions surrounding the motivations behind
mergers, the effects of mergers on firm performance and the expected reactions of
investors upon the announcement of a merger. However, the existing literature does not
address the actual reactions of investors, given all of this information, upon the
announcement of a merger. There has been no research with data past 2004 to identify
whether or not investors have responded to the emerging trend of merger activity
positively or negatively. For example, investors may have reacted negatively to the news
of an acquisition before the threat of excess capacity became readily apparent. Now,
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however, they may have identified the problem and view acquisitions as a good solution
to excess capacity. I examine the reactions of shareholders to the announcement of
mergers in my sample of 194 deals between 2002 and 2008. I then determine whether or
not the threat of excess capacity is recognized by the typical investor and what effect
(positive or negative) it has stock return. Do investors expect pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies to merge if they face the risk of excess capacity?

Data
3.1 Acquisition Identification
I identify acquisitions using Bloomberg’s Mergers and Acquisitions Advanced
Search feature. I search by Deal Type, Date Range, Region/Country, Sector/Industry and
Public/Private. My initial list includes company takeovers announced between January 1,
2002 and December 31, 2008, where the acquirer is a US-based, public firm, and both the
acquirer and the target company are in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.
Bloomberg identified 483 deals that met these search criteria. I then eliminate any deals
classified as a divestiture, as I will not be able to collect pre-merger excess capacity
measures (described in detail below) on subsidiaries of firms. I also do not consider firms
with multiple acquirers because it would be impossible to determine how the target is
divided among the acquirers. Finally, I search each acquiring firm and delete those who
were considered to be in the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industry by Bloomberg, but
do not fit the type of firm I am considering. For example, several firms produce
nutritional products, owned pharmacies, or were involved in agricultural biotechnology.
These firms have different business models and are subject to different regulations in
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approval of products than the pure big pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms. Finally, I
do not eliminate deals that were terminated after the announcement date, as I want to
avoid selection bias. After narrowing down my list of firms, my final list is comprised of
150 firms participating in 194 deals.
3.2 Event Study Data Collection
To complete my event study, I collect daily closing prices for each firm from
October 1, 2001 to December 31, 2008 from Bloomberg. I also collect closing prices for
the S&P 500 index for the same date range. I then calculate return manually for the
individual firms and the S&P 500 index using (P1 – P0)/P0. I calculate return manually
because for many of the companies, no price was recorded for various trading days. I
need the period for which the return is calculated to be consistent across the index and the
firm to which it is compared.
3.3 Excess Capacity Data Collection
I also use Bloomberg to collect sales and research and development expense for
each firm from three years before the announcement of the acquisition to the year of the
announcement. I use research and development expense divided by sales as a measure of
research and development intensity. In addition, I use sales growth as a measure of excess
capacity. Finally, I collect the book value of assets, long term debt and market value of
equity for each firm the year before the announcement. I then calculate Tobin’s Q for
each firm, using the equation, (long term debt + market value of equity)/(book value of
total assets) (Danzon et al., 2007).
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Methodology
4.1 Event Study
To determine the effect of the announcement of a merger or acquisition on the
pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms in my sample, I run an event study and calculate
the abnormal return on the day of the announcement. I follow a typical event study as
explained by the Data and Statistical Services at Princeton University and edited by
Professors Henrik Cronqvist and Darren Filson. I use the announcement of the merger as
the event date and the S&P 500 index as the market returns to which the returns of each
individual firm will be compared. I start by calculating the event window for each firm,
which includes a total of five days – two days before the event, the day of the event and
two days after the event. I use a small event window because I do not want to
inadvertently consider events besides the announcement of the merger or acquisition. I
then calculate the estimation window for each firm, which includes sixty days before to
ten days before the event date for the firm returns and the market returns. I set up the
estimation window in order to compare the firm returns to market returns and find the
correlation between the two. I am then able to estimate the market model and predict firm
returns.
I predict the firm returns from the market model in order to determine whether or
not the returns actually observed on the event date were expected. If there is no difference
between the returns observed on the event date and the returns predicted by the market
model, then the announcement of the acquisition did not cause any abnormal returns for
shareholders. That is, the announcement of the merger did not increase or decrease value
for the shareholders of the firm in the form of unexpected stock returns.
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After predicting the firms’ returns, I compute the abnormal return by comparing
the actual return to that predicted by the market. I then calculate the t-statistic for each
event and across all events. I finish my event study with cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) and a t-statistic for each event and for all of the events together.
4.2 Excess Capacity Measures
I use three financial measures that indicate excess capacity in a pharmaceutical or
biotechnology firm, as used by previous research (Higgins et al., 2005 and Danzon et al.,
2007). First, I consider the intensity of a firm’s research and development, as measured
by the firm’s research and development expense as a percent of sales. As mentioned
previously, research and development productivity in the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry has largely declined over the past decade. Therefore, it is safe to
make the assumption that a firm with large research and development investment is at
higher risk for research and development deterioration, causing the firm to look to
acquire new compounds and products in order to develop and fill the pipeline. As proven
by Higgins et al., firms with higher research and development have a higher propensity to
undertake acquisitions.
Second, I use the change in sales growth from three years prior to the
announcement to one year prior to the announcement as a measure of excess capacity. As
patent cliffs arrive for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, they face increased
competition from generic drugs. The generics rapidly gain market share and diminish
sales for the original producers of the brand-name drug. Therefore, a consistent decrease
in sales can be an indication of excess capacity for a pharmaceutical or biotechnology
firm. The firms no longer have patent protection and have gaps in their product pipelines.
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Danzon et al. use lagged sales growth as a measure of excess capacity to demonstrate
that, regardless of the size of the firm, slower growth of sales greatly increased the
propensity for a firm to merge as a response to distress on the firm from excess capacity.
I use Tobin’s Q (market value of assets to book value of assets) as the final
measure of excess capacity. Tobin’s Q is sensitive to changes in the value of intangible
assets and, therefore, is a good measure of excess capacity for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms. As the firms face competition from generics and their patent cliffs
arrive, the value of their patents and compounds decrease. This should change the market
value of their assets, which would be reflected in the Tobin’s Q. Both Higgins et al. and
Danzon et al. both use Tobin’s Q as a measure of excess capacity and find that a lower
Tobin’s Q is associated with a firm undertaking an acquisition.

Results
5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
I estimate predicted returns for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms in my
sample by comparing stock returns to market returns from sixty days to ten days before
the announcement of an acquisition. I then regress actual returns on the returns I predict
for each firm during the event window. Tables 2.1-2.3 report summary statistics for the
cumulative abnormal returns calculated. Across all events, the average cumulative
abnormal return was -0.00587% with a standard deviation of 0.127%. Cumulative
abnormal returns range from -0.481% to 0.652%. From 2002-2004, the average
cumulative abnormal return was 0.000809%, and from 2005-2008, the average
cumulative abnormal return was 0.0108593%. While cumulative abnormal returns are not

13

significant across all of the events in my sample, I still use them to test excess capacity
measures. It is possible that there is cross-sectional variation in my sample due to excess
capacity. Therefore, the cumulative abnormal returns’ lack of significance does not
matter in this case.
One possible error in my event study is the fact that the beta estimated by the
estimation window can clearly be incorrect. In that case, all of the abnormal returns
calculated based on predicted returns could also be incorrect. Brown and Warner (1985)
test to see how the characteristics specific to daily returns affect the results of event
study. The authors determine that standard methodologies (such as the one utilized in this
paper) are so well-specified that daily data generally have no effect on results. Therefore,
the worry of a false beta is mitigated by the fact that I use daily data for a short-run event
study.
5.2 The Effect of Excess Capacity on Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Table 4 reports the effect of excess capacity measures on the cumulative abnormal
returns calculated in my event study. The results support the hypothesis that investors
respond positively to an acquisition undertaken as a response to excess capacity. I use
three different variables to measure excess capacity: R&D intensity (research and
development as a percent of sales) for three years before, two years before, one year
before and the year of the announcement, sales growth from three years before to one
year before the announcement, and Tobin’s Q for one year before the announcement. For
the entire sample, all deals announced between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2008,
R&D intensity and Tobin’s Q the year of the announcement are significant. A 100%
increase in R&D intensity two years before the announcement leads to a 0.00120%
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increase in cumulative abnormal returns. The average R&D intensity two years before the
announcement is 499%. Assuming sales for that average firm is constant at $100,000 and
research and development expense is about $50 million, an increase in research and
development expense of $10 million (to $60 million) would increase cumulative
abnormal return over the event window by 0.00120%. In addition, a 100% increase in
Tobin’s Q the year of the announcement leads to a 0.000747% increase in cumulative
abnormal returns.
Investors recognize the danger big pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
face when they exhibit characteristics of excess capacity and do not respond to them.
When a firm’s sales slow, they are most likely facing increased competition from generic
drugs. Investors have started to recognize this characteristic of excess capacity and
reward the firm when they respond by acquiring new compounds.
While the excess capacity theory suggests that Tobin’s Q should have a negative
relationship with cumulative abnormal returns, a positive correlation does not necessarily
contradict the theory. A large Tobin’s Q is an indication that a firm can finance an
acquisition due to its relatively high stock price (Danzon et al., 2007). Therefore, a
positive relationship can simply indicate that the financing effect of Tobin’s Q is
outweighing the excess capacity effect of the measure.
Tables 5 and 6 report the effects of excess capacity on cumulative abnormal
returns in the first and second half of the sample (2002-2004 and 2005-2008),
respectively. I divide the results by period in order to determine whether or not investors
begin to recognize excess capacity as reason for a merger. Especially given the fact that
the results across the entire period are somewhat inconclusive, it is necessary to see if
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investor behavior changes as more mergers are announced and as time passes to
determine whether or not these mergers actually improve firm and shareholder value.
When broken down by period, I receive different results for the excess capacity
measures I consider. For the early period, deals announced between January 1, 2002 and
December 31, 2004, only sales growth and Tobin’s Q are significant in the final
regression. In addition, there is a positive relationship between sales growth and
cumulative abnormal return. Specifically, a 100% increase in sales growth means an
increase of 0.00178% in cumulative abnormal return. The average sales growth for firms
announcing deals between 2002 and 2004 is 526%. Assuming sales for this average firm
in year t-3 is constant at $1 million and sales in year t-1 is $6.26 million, then an increase
of $1 million in sales (to $7.26 million) would increase cumulative abnormal return in the
event window by 0.00178%. This contradicts the excess capacity theory, as an increase in
sales growth indicates that new products are being marketed and that generics have not
begun to decrease market share. Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with cumulative
abnormal returns, which also contradicts the excess capacity theory. A 100% increase in
Tobin’s Q leads to a 0.00159% increase in cumulative abnormal return. As mentioned
previously, Tobin’s Q can be reflective of not only excess capacity, but also ability to
finance acquisitions. These results suggest that from 2002 to 2004, investors did not
acknowledge mergers and acquisitions as an appropriate response to excess capacity
issues. This is not to say that investors did not recognize the rapid research and
development deterioration and decrease in research and development productivity that
plagues the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. Instead, investors did not see
mergers and acquisitions as a solution to the problem. It is worthwhile to note that while
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results do change for the years 2005-2008 (as explained below) I am not suggesting that
acquisitions in response to excess capacity do, in fact, add value.
As displayed in Table 6, the results for deals announced between January 1, 2005
and December 31, 2008 support the theory that investors reward firms for responding to
excess capacity with mergers and acquisitions. Larger research and development intensity
increases cumulative abnormal return. A 100% increase in research and development
intensity (research and development expense as a percent of sales) increases cumulative
abnormal returns by 0.00125%. The average research and development intensity in year
t-2 for firms announcing deals between 2005 and 2008 is 460%. Therefore, for the
average firm, assuming research and development expense in year t-2 is $46 million and
sales is constant at $100,000, an increase in research and development expense of $10
million (to $56 million) would lead to an increase in cumulative abnormal return during
the event window of 0.00125%. In addition, a decrease in sales growth from three years
before the announcement to one year before the announcement increases cumulative
abnormal returns upon the announcement of an acquisition. A 100% decrease in sales
growth during this time period increases cumulative abnormal returns by 0.000541%.
The average sales growth for firms announcing deals between 2005 and 2008 is 450%.
Therefore, assuming that sales in year t-3 is $1 million and in year t-1 is $5.5 million, a
decrease in sales of $1 million in year t-1 (to $4.5 million) would lead to an increase in
cumulative abnormal return over the event window of 0.000541%. When investors
acknowledge that a firm suffers from excess capacity, they respond positively to the
announcement of an acquisition.
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Discussion
When considering my sample as a whole, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to
the effect of excess capacity on cumulative abnormal returns. While research and
development intensity appears to play a role in increasing cumulative abnormal return
over the event window around the announcement date, the positive relationship between
Tobin’s Q and cumulative abnormal return sheds some doubt on the real impact of excess
capacity. However, a larger Tobin’s Q can demonstrate a firm’s ability to finance an
acquisition. Therefore, it appears that investors respond positively to the announcement
of a merger when a firm demonstrates excess capacity characteristics and is able to
finance the acquisition.
After dividing the sample by date, it appears that investors’ recognition of
acquisitions as a response to excess capacity changed from 2002 to 2008. In the first half
of the sample, from 2002-2004, investors do not appear to react to the announcement of
acquisitions as a firm’s response to excess capacity. Instead, the results demonstrate that
if the firm has the ability to finance an acquisition, as seen through positive sales growth
and a large Tobin’s Q, investors react positively to the announcement of the acquisition.
On the other hand, from 2005-2008, excess capacity does appear to have an effect on
cumulative abnormal return. Research and development intensity is positively correlated
with cumulative abnormal returns. Investors acknowledge that a higher research and
development investment leaves the firm at a higher risk and likelihood of deterioration.
Sales growth is negatively correlated with cumulative abnormal returns, again
demonstrating that when investors acknowledge a firm’s excess capacity they react
positively to the announcement of a merger, as it serves as a solution for the firm. Again,

18

it is hypothesized that the acquirers in my sample face the threat of excess capacity and
do not have the pipeline to maintain sales. Therefore, they respond by acquiring smaller
firms whose assets, such as their compounds and discovery technologies, will help fill in
the acquirers’ gaps. The results demonstrate that over the period of 2002 to 2008,
investors began to realize that acquisitions were, in fact, a response to excess capacity.
Therefore, from 2005 to 2008, investors react positively to the news of an acquisition
when they observe characteristics of excess capacity in the firm.
While these trends are supported by the results, the cumulative abnormal returns
are not significant across all events. This means that the announcement of an acquisition
by a big pharmaceutical or biotechnology firm was anticipated by investors. Previous
literature has consistently proven that excess capacity increases a firm’s propensity to
participate in merger activity. Danzon et al. and Higgins et al. use the same excess
capacity measures to predict the probability that a firm will acquire a company. My
results demonstrate that investors now expect that firms respond to excess capacity by
acquiring firms and filling in their pipeline gaps.

Conclusion
I analyzed investors’ reaction to the announcement of an acquisition in
pharmaceutical and biotechnology deals from 2002 to 2008. I used an event study to
determine the size of the reaction to the news of the event and calculated cumulative
abnormal returns. I then tested whether or not the threat of excess capacity in a firm had
an effect on cumulative abnormal returns. I investigated how the investors reacted when
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they recognized this excess capacity threat using financial measures, such as Tobin’s Q,
sales growth, and research and development intensity.
Across all events, cumulative abnormal returns were not different from zero. This
indicated that from 2002 to 2008, investors anticipated the announcement of an
acquisition from the firms in my sample. When testing to find the effect of excess
capacity on the cumulative abnormal returns, I found that it was not clear whether a
relationship existed or not. However, when breaking the sample into an early and late
period, a trend in investor behavior appeared. From 2002 to 2004, investors reacted to the
announcement of an acquisition as if the threat of excess capacity was not recognized.
That is, if the firm demonstrated the financial ability to fund an acquisition, investors
responded positively. Excess capacity measures were not statistically significant in this
period. However, from 2005-2008, investors responded positively to the announcement
of an acquisition when the firm faced excess capacity. This indicates that investors began
to recognize that firms were responding to gaps in their pipelines and the approaching of
patent cliffs by acquiring smaller firms and their products.
No determination can be made from these results about the actual value added to
the firm and its shareholders after the acquisition occurred. In addition, the trend of
excess capacity recognition apparent from 2005 to 2008 does not mean that the
acquisitions that took place between 2002 and 2004 were successful in mitigating the
effect of excess capacity. My results simply demonstrate that investors begin to
acknowledge the threat of excess capacity and react differently to the announcement of
an acquisition.
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Table 1 – Definition of Variables
List of Variables
Variable

Definition

cumulative_abnormal_return
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc

Cumulative abnormal returns
R&D as a percent of sales three years before the announcement
R&D as a percent of sales two years before the announcement
R&D as a percent of sales one year before the announcement
R&D as a percent of sales the year of the announcement
Sales growth from three years before to one year before the announcement
Tobin's Q one year before the announcement
Market Capitalization the year of the announcement
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Table 2.1 – Summary Statistics 2002-2008
Variable
cumulative_abnormal_return
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc

Obs
194
193
194
192
184
194
194
189

Mean
-0.0058674
6.650784
4.898271
6.472064
6.50223
4.827146
20.97949
26938.52

Std. Dev.
0.1270811
33.56538
25.82638
56.2134
46.80435
27.80351
24.86845
48999.22

Min
Max
-0.4806167 0.6520224
0 317.7097
0 269.5548
0
774.925
0 567.0787
-1 296.9107
0.2359125 193.1889
0.2211089
200949

Table 2.2 – Summary Statistics 2002-2004
Variable
Obs
83
cumulative_abnormal_return
83
rdt3
83
rdt2
82
rdt1
78
rdt
83
change_sg
83
qt1
80
mc

Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
0.0008085 0.1467298 -0.3240206 0.6520224
7.564609
35.23176
0 310.4546
5.296048
29.78497
0 269.5548
3.372066
8.254612 0.0269495 46.68085
5.058296
28.29142 0.0279523 250.0899
5.261908
25.6838
-0.9756 170.7039
22.7243
27.82509 0.520613 193.1889
18871.9
42941.21
5.48555
200949

Table 2.3 – Summary Statistics 2005-2008
Variable
cumulative_abnormal_return
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc

Obs
111
110
111
110
106
111
111
109

Mean Std. Dev.
-0.0108593 0.1105762
5.961262 32.39769
4.600834
22.5555
8.782972 73.98581
7.564748 56.81842
4.502054 29.39952
19.67481 22.44791
32858.97 52411.79

Min
Max
-0.4806167 0.4306238
0
317.7097
0
219.8401
0
774.925
0
567.0787
-1
296.9107
0.2359125
163.4788
0.2211089
184511.6
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Table 3 – Correlation Matrix

CARs*
CARs*
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc

1
-0.0071
0.2585
-0.0754
-0.0729
-0.1785
-0.0932
0.1084

rdt3
1
0.2353
0.0625
0.2338
0.3684
-0.1253
-0.1185

rdt2

1
0.0236
0.0499
0.0916
-0.0905
-0.1185

rdt1

1
0.9808
-0.0293
0.6153
-0.0769

rdt

1
-0.0195
0.5841
-0.0845

change_sg

1
-0.1235
-0.1179

qt1

1
-0.1953

mc

1
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Table 4 – 2002-2008: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative
abnormal returns.

VARIABLES
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
cumulative_abnormal_return
-0.000315
(0.000383)
0.00132***
(0.000432)
-0.000828**
(0.000385)
0.000674
(0.000469)
0.000785
(0.000609)
0.00125***
(0.000414)
2.05e-07
(1.80e-07)
-0.0444***
(0.0138)
183
0.129
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
cumulative_abnormal_return

0.00120***
(0.000344)

0.000747**
(0.000357)

-0.0274**
(0.0118)
194
0.075
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Table 5 – 2002-2004: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative
abnormal returns.

VARIABLES
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
cumulative_abnormal_return cumulative_abnormal_return
-0.00116
(0.00219)
0.00159
(0.00214)
-0.000868
(0.00197)
0.000702
(0.000546)
0.00186
(0.00113)
0.00209***
(0.000621)
1.73e-08
(3.58e-07)
-0.0544**
(0.0244)
78
0.239
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.00178***
(0.000581)
0.00159***
(0.000536)

-0.0446**
(0.0195)
83
0.177
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Table 6 – 2005-2008: The effect of excess capacity measures on cumulative
abnormal returns.

VARIABLES
rdt3
rdt2
rdt1
rdt
change_sg
qt1
mc
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
cumulative_abnormal_return cumulative_abnormal_return
0.000978
(0.000960)
0.00124***
(0.000464)
0.00187
(0.00188)
-0.00270
(0.00259)
-0.00336**
(0.00154)
-7.56e-05
(0.000590)
2.35e-07
(1.96e-07)
-0.0227
(0.0180)
105
0.139
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.00125***
(0.000470)

-0.000541
(0.000361)

-0.0142
(0.0105)
111
0.068

